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STRUCTURAL AND RELATIONAL INFLUENCES ON THE ROLE OF 
REWARD INTERDEPENDENCE IN PRODUCT INNOVATION 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between reward interdependence, or the 
extent to which managers’ rewards are tied to the performance of colleagues in other 
functions, and product innovation. It also considers how structural and relational features 
of the organizational context might moderate this relationship. Our analysis of a sample 
of Canadian-based firms reveals a positive relationship between reward interdependence 
and product innovation that is invigorated at higher levels of job rotation, social 
interaction, and interactional fairness, but we find no evidence of a moderating effect of 
decision autonomy. Consistent with a systems approach to organizational contingencies, 
we also find that the reward interdependence–product innovation relationship is stronger 
when the organization’s context comes closer to an “ideal” holistic configuration that is 
most conducive to knowledge exchange within the organization, with a more prominent 
role played by the relational sub-context (social interaction and interactional fairness) 
than the structural sub-context (job rotation and decision autonomy). The findings have 
important implications for innovation research as they shed light on how the extent to 
which individual rewards are tied to collective performance can be channeled to enhance 
innovation pursuits. 
 
Keywords: product innovation; reward interdependence; knowledge-based view; 
structural context; relational context  
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To increase their performance in the global marketplace, firms benefit from 
enhancing their innovative capacity, particularly their ability to engage in product 
innovation (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Moran and Ghoshal, 1999). A firm’s product 
innovation in turn is critically informed by the effective coordination of managerial 
efforts across functional units, including both technology- and marketing-oriented 
functions (Barczak and Wilemon, 2003; Lopez Cabrales et al., 2008; Townsend et al., 
2010). Such coordination can provide important foundations for novel ideas to emerge 
and flourish (Sherman et al., 2005; Sundgren et al., 2005), though it also inherently 
confronts challenges, such as clashes between departmental subcultures (Griffin and 
Hauser, 1996; Strang and Jung, 2009), or fights for company resources (Luo et al., 2006). 
To stimulate cross-functional coordination despite these challenges, some organizations 
make managers’ rewards contingent on the performance of colleagues in other functional 
units (Song et al., 1996; Xie et al., 2003). This reward interdependence implies that 
managerial rewards are tied to or constrained by the performance of others (Dougherty, 
2008; Wageman, 1995).  
Reward interdependence can facilitate product innovation by reconciling rival 
internal positions or perspectives (McDonough, 2000; Xie et al., 2003). Thus, previous 
research has suggested that interdependent rewards can be instrumental for integrating the 
divergent opinions that emerge when organizations strive to renew their existing product 
set in response to new external market conditions (Song et al., 1996). The theoretical 
mechanisms that underpin this beneficial role of reward interdependence is the 
motivation to collaborate across functional boundaries (Collins and Clark, 2003; 
McDonough, 2000) and the associated ability to create and reward synergies across 
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functional domains (Gilbert, 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005). However, translating 
reward interdependence into enhanced product innovation is not an automatic process; it 
is fundamentally dependent on whether managers openly share their function-specific 
knowledge (De Dreu, 2007; Lee and Ahn, 2007; Love and Roper, 2009). In particular, 
when managers’ rewards depend on others’ performance, managers actually may become 
less motivated to share and leverage function-specific knowledge with organizational 
peers, to the extent that they believe that others’ contributions will jeopardize their own 
efforts (Lee and Ahn, 2007). 
Furthermore, in practices where interdependent rewards are blended with 
individual ones (Parker et al., 2000), researchers find that this combination does not 
necessarily capture the best of both worlds. For instance, Wageman (1995) and Wageman 
and Baker (1997) find that a mixed reward model, if not properly structured, can result in 
managers investing much of their time on their own agendas and pursuits, and avoiding 
interdependent actions in their cross-functional responsibilities and tasks. Similarly, 
Quigley et al. (2007) find that the inclusion of interdependent rewards can reduce intra-
firm knowledge exchange and undercut group cooperation. Against this backdrop, recent 
studies emphasize the need for further exploration into the contextual contingencies that 
make interdependent rewards beneficial (Barnes et al., 2011; Chen and Tjosvold, 2012). 
This gap, therefore, provides the main motivation for this article: How might the 
relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation depend on specific 
characteristics of the organization’s internal context?  
 In response, we draw from the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996; Szulanski, 
1996) to investigate how knowledge-enhancing organizational features may increase the 
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effectiveness of reward interdependence for product innovation. Echoing the established 
importance of structural arrangements (Griffin and Hauser, 1996; Leenders et al., 2007) 
and social relationship building (Lawson et al., 2009; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998) for 
spurring innovation, we focus on the moderating roles of job rotation and decision 
autonomy (two structural features), and social interaction and interactional fairness (two 
relational features). Job rotation captures the degree to which managers rotate across or 
are assigned to different units (Campion et al., 1994). As a cooperative management tool, 
job rotation can promote managers’ understanding and appreciation of the activities 
undertaken in functional areas other than their own (de Weerd-Neerhof et al., 2002). 
Decision autonomy reflects the extent to which decision making is decentralized and 
managers have greater control over their collaboration efforts with peers in other 
functions (Takeuchi et al., 2008). Social interaction involves the strength of the social 
relationships between managers: It taps informal relationships, as epitomized in the 
extent to which managers interact beyond formal work routines (Tsai and Ghoshal, 
1998). Interactional fairness is the extent to which managers believe they receive high-
quality interpersonal treatment when interacting with others, including respect and 
consideration (Qiu et al., 2009). Significantly, the glue that binds these four features is 
their ability to promote cross-functional knowledge flows, which in turn can help resolve 
the constraint or tension that managers may experience when their individual rewards are 
tied to how well colleagues perform (Dougherty, 2008) 
In addition, acknowledging the complexity of the organizational processes that 
may accompany the conversion of interdependent rewards into product innovation 
(Barnes et al., 2011; Beersma et al., 2003; Chen and Tjosvold, 2012; Wageman and 
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Baker, 1997), we apply a systems perspective (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Ketchen et 
al., 1993, 1997) to understand how these four organizational contingencies collectively 
translate interdependent rewards into enhanced product innovation. Thus, we consider 
how these features constitute a conceptually meaningful gestalt (Covin et al., 2006; 
Weber, 1904) that influences an organization’s ability to exploit reward interdependence 
effectively. Through this simultaneous consideration of contextual features, we take into 
account their mutual dependencies (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Payne, 2006). In 
particular, we explicate how the proximity to an “ideal” configuration of organizational 
features that is best suited to promote internal knowledge flows informs the conversion of 
reward interdependence into production innovation (Burger, 1987; Meyer et al., 1993). 
To the best of our knowledge, this systems approach has rarely been applied to studies in 
the realm of R&D management research. 
THEORY 
Developing new products typically requires not only the combined efforts of 
various functional units—notably technology-oriented units, such as R&D and 
engineering, and their marketing-oriented counterparts, such as marketing and sales 
(Lovelace et al., 2001; De Luca and Atuahene-Gima, 2007)—but also the ability to 
coordinate and collaborate in these efforts (Benghozi, 1990; Crossan and Apaydin, 2010; 
Hauptman and Hiriji, 1999). Reward interdependence can be instrumental in this process 
because it increases feelings of shared “ownership” across units that search collectively 
for creative solutions to organizational problems (McDonough, 2000). When managers’ 
rewards are connected to the performance of colleagues in other functional areas, 
managers’ will likely focus less on their personal turf and instead become more receptive 
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to the suggestions and expertise of others (Johnson and Johnson, 1989; Lin, 2010; Zhang 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, when functional managers earn rewards for their collective 
rather than individual performance, their contributions to the product innovation process 
can be synchronized more easily by top management (Smith and Tushman, 2005).  
Despite its possible benefits, reward interdependence might also constrain 
managerial actions toward product innovation (Farjoun and Starbuck, 2007). First, 
managers in better performing units may believe that the returns on their product 
innovation efforts are in jeopardy if their rewards depend on colleagues who may be less 
committed to the firm’s innovative pursuits (Lee and Ahn, 2007). Second, reward 
interdependence may induce the better performing units to exert undue pressure on 
poorly performing counterparts (Barnes et al., 2011; Drabman et al., 1974), such that the 
latter experience feelings of extreme anxiety and become less collaborative (Ames, 1981; 
Wageman and Baker, 1997). Third, when individual rewards link to collective 
performance, the danger of free-riding looms large (Chen and Tjosvold, 2012; Wageman, 
1995), whereby managers in underperforming areas exploit reward interdependence to 
lessen their contributions to product innovation projects and anticipate that more diligent 
colleagues will take up the slack, especially if individual contributions cannot be easily 
observed (Williams et al., 1981). Poorly performing managers thus may feel as though 
they can “hide in the crowd,” knowing that they are less likely to be held personally 
accountable for their individual performance or potential missteps (Karau and Williams, 
1993). Finally, when reward interdependence is high, weaker managers may come to 
believe that their efforts and actions do not affect collective outcomes with respect to 
product innovation at all (Harkins and Petty, 1982; Latane et al., 1979). Thus, reward 
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interdependence can lead to both a lower sense of individual accountability and a greater 
feeling of personal dispensability (George, 1992; Price et al., 2006). 
We draw from the knowledge-based view (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Grant, 1996) to 
argue that the ability to counter these challenges—to ensure that the use of reward 
interdependence spurs product innovation—critically depends on organizational 
conditions that prompt effective combinations of knowledge across functional units, 
including structural (job rotation and decision autonomy) and relational (social 
interaction and interactional fairness) features. According to the knowledge-based view, 
knowledge exchanges among areas that span different content domains reduce the 
uncertainty that managers experience when undertaking collective tasks (Grant, 1996; 
Spender, 1996). Because the effective application of reward interdependence requires an 
understanding of the capabilities that are dispersed across the organization’s ranks (Lin, 
2010), knowledge exchanges that span different functional areas thus may be critical for 
reducing the aforementioned challenges of implementing reward interdependence (Floyd 
and Wooldridge, 1999; Levin and Cross, 2004). In other words, our main theoretical 
premise is that organizational features, such as job rotation, decision autonomy, social 
interaction, and interactional fairness, that promote intra-firm knowledge sharing should 
be particularly useful for enhancing the effective implementation of reward 
interdependence. 
First, in the context of product innovation, job rotation across different functional 
units (Campion et al., 1994) can help disseminate knowledge about new markets and 
technologies by exposing managers to the diversity of the firm’s activity portfolio (Xie et 
al., 2003). Second, by granting them the autonomy to make decisions and control their 
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activities, the firm can encourage managers to show initiative and engage in knowledge 
integration efforts with colleagues in other units (Takeuchi et al., 2008). Third, because 
social interaction entails the presence of strong informal relationships within an 
organization (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), it is a critical component of the firm’s internal 
social capital, which in turn enhances the creation of new ideas and knowledge (Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal, 1998). Fourth, when managers treat one another with kindness and 
consideration—that is, when interactional fairness is high—personal biases likely get 
suppressed, and their mutual respect enhances the likelihood they will share their 
knowledge with one another (Bies and Moag, 1986; Qiu et al., 2009). 
In what follows, we offer several arguments with respect to both the direct 
relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation as well as the 
moderating effects of the aforementioned structural and relational features on this 
relationship. In addition, we apply a systems perspective to the role of organizational 
contingencies (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Govindarajan, 1988; Vorhies and Morgan, 
2003) to investigate how the simultaneous presence of these four features, through their 
holistic configuration, informs the effectiveness of reward interdependence for enhancing 
product innovation. Figure 1 shows our conceptual framework. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Direct Effect of Reward Interdependence 
As our baseline premise, we anticipate a positive relationship between reward 
interdependence and product innovation. The pursuit of product innovation demands the 
transcendence of individual interests across functional boundaries (Floyd and Lane, 2000; 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), which can be stimulated by collective rewards (Collins 
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and Smith, 2006). To the extent that the firm emphasizes joint rather than individual 
rewards, individual managers should be more committed to the firm’s product innovation 
pursuits, even if they are risky and complex, because the rewards install a normative form 
of control rather than a purely utilitarian one based on individual interests (Bloom, 1999; 
Collins and Clark, 2003). Similarly, reward interdependence creates a sense of project 
ownership in cross-functional collaborations (McDonough, 2000), which promotes 
efforts to introduce innovative ideas and integrate others’ ideas into the firm’s current 
operating domains (O’Reilly and Tushman, 2004). Further, while functional managers 
may appreciate opportunities for generating innovative output, top management are 
typically better placed to grasp the potential for synergistic value creation through the 
combination of novel ideas that are dispersed across functional areas, and then to 
determine ways to reward these synergies (Gilbert, 2006; Smith and Tushman, 2005). 
Based on these arguments, we formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a positive relationship between the extent of reward interdependence 
across functional units and product innovation. 
 
Moderating Effect of Job Rotation 
We also postulate that the relationship between reward interdependence and 
product innovation should be stronger with higher levels of job rotation. Job rotation 
leads to enhanced learning and knowledge acquisition among managers (Campion et al., 
1994; Dedoussis, 1995), including a better understanding of how their coordinated efforts 
can lead to an improved collective performance (Kusunoki and Numagami, 1998). Job 
rotation also can induce a common “dominant logic” among managers, an organization-
wide template for how function-specific knowledge should contribute to the collective 
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goal of spurring product innovation (Burke and Steensma, 1998). This logic can create a 
deeper understanding of how synergistic value might emerge from the combination of 
function-specific knowledge (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998), which lets managers reap the 
intended benefits of reward interdependence more easily. In contrast, with minimal job 
rotation, individual managers are less likely to perceive possibilities for combining or 
integrating knowledge residing in the various functions, nor to recognize the merits of 
their colleagues’ expertise and its contributions to collective performance (Xie et al., 
2003). In turn, they may resist the implementation of reward interdependence because 
they doubt that combinations of function-specific knowledge actually can foster 
aspirations with respect to product innovation (Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
H2: The relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation is 
moderated by job rotation, such that the relationship is stronger at higher levels 
of job rotation. 
 
Moderating Effect of Decision Autonomy 
Reward interdependence should also be more instrumental for product innovation 
when decision autonomy is higher. First, decision autonomy affords functional managers 
the freedom and flexibility to exchange knowledge with their peers in a way that leads to 
innovative outcomes that benefit all parties involved (Takeuchi et al., 2008). That is, 
granting decision autonomy gives managers the freedom to explore how their function-
specific knowledge relates to that of colleagues in other areas (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004), which may help them understand how novel knowledge combinations across 
functional units can improve their collective performance in product innovation 
(McDonough, 2000). Further, high levels of decision autonomy signal greater 
consideration by top management, which should stimulate individual managers’ 
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motivation to accept an evaluation system in which their rewards are contingent on the 
efforts and actions of others (Yukl and Fu, 1999). In contrast, in the presence of strongly 
centralized decision making, individual managers should be more inclined to carry out 
just their assigned, function-specific tasks, even if their rewards are tied to the 
performance of others, and should express reduced interest in finding out how their 
knowledge might be leveraged or combined with that of other functional units to generate 
new products (Sethi and Sethi, 2009). Thus, the promotion of product innovation through 
reward interdependence should be curtailed when individual managers perceive less 
control over their own decision making. 
H3: The relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation is 
moderated by decision autonomy, such that the relationship is stronger at higher 
levels of decision autonomy. 
 
Moderating Effect of Social Interaction 
We also expect that the relationship between reward interdependence and product 
innovation is stronger at higher levels of social interaction. Strong social relationships 
across functional units may enhance the diversity of the knowledge exchanged, as well as 
improve insights into how the dispersed knowledge is interconnected—types of 
understanding that may not come to the surface through formal mechanisms (Nonaka, 
1994). Because strong social interactions expose individual managers to a broader and 
richer set of information (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et al., 2001), the 
managers have a larger arsenal of collective knowledge at their disposal when pursuing 
novel ideas and searching for collaborative new product solutions to current 
organizational problems (Sundgren et al., 2005); thus, a system that ties individual 
rewards to collective performance should be more effective in this case. When 
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interdependent partners work toward a common goal, their strong social relationships can 
also enhance the intensity of their efforts to reach that goal and, as a result, their ability to 
reach a collective outcome that benefits all parties involved (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Xie 
et al., 2003). Similarly, Uzzi (1997) has argued that informal exchanges increase joint 
problem-solving efforts and thus the ability to learn more from cross-functional 
collaboration through coordination mechanisms such as reward interdependence. Finally, 
social interaction may help leverage the instrumentality of reward interdependence 
because it prompts greater trust among managers (Granovetter, 1985), which decreases 
feelings of anxiety that managers might experience when their rewards are constrained by 
the performance of others (Ames, 1981). 
H4: The relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation is 
moderated by social interaction, such that the relationship is stronger at higher 
levels of social interaction. 
 
Moderating Effect of Interactional Fairness 
Further, the beneficial effect of reward interdependence on product innovation 
should be stronger at higher levels of interactional fairness. First, higher levels of reward 
interdependence imply greater vulnerability as individual managers come to rely 
increasingly on efforts and actions of others that are beyond their own control (Lee and 
Ahn, 2007; Kuvaas, 2008). When interactions are perceived as fair and respectful, these 
feelings of vulnerability will be mitigated, including the fear that efforts undertaken by 
colleagues will jeopardize one’s own efforts to attain high collective performance (Coyle-
Shapiro et al., 2004; Qiu et al., 2009). Second, fairness perceptions reduce the time that 
managers spend questioning or fighting the decisions of others (Bies and Moag, 1986) so 
they can devote more attention to how to combine their function-specific knowledge with 
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that of others to enhance collective organizational performance on product innovation 
projects (Floyd and Lane, 2000; Love and Roper, 2009). Conversely, in conditions of low 
interactional fairness, the anxiety that interdependent managers might feel about others’ 
contributions, and particularly their lack of contributions, may be exacerbated by the 
psychological tension and distress that typically accompanies unfair situations (Rupp and 
Cropanzano, 2002). The resulting negative response to reward interdependence may 
decrease the intensity of managerial efforts to find effective combinations of their own 
and others’ function-specific knowledge, thereby reducing the instrumentality of reward 
interdependence for product innovation. 
H5: The relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation is 
moderated by interactional fairness, such that the relationship is stronger at 
higher levels of interactional fairness. 
 
Moderating Effect of Proximity to the Ideal Holistic Configuration 
Hypotheses 2–5 capture the individual moderating effects of job rotation, decision 
autonomy, social interaction, and interactional fairness on the reward interdependence–
product innovation relationship and may provide an incomplete picture by focusing on 
their independent effects (De Clercq et al., 2010; Payne et al., 2006). That is, the 
hypotheses assume the knowledge-promotion effect of each of the four contextual 
features separately, without considering the possibility that their individual effects may 
be suboptimal if any of the other features is low (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). In 
contrast, when we acknowledge that these aspects of the organizational context operate 
simultaneously and represent a holistic configuration, a systems approach to 
understanding their collective effect provides useful, complementary insights (Meyer et 
al., 1993; Vorhies and Morgan, 2003).  
 15 
Previous research in strategic management and entrepreneurship indicates that 
holistic configurations of multiple contingencies enhance the understanding of their 
simultaneous roles in leveraging organizational decision-making policies (e.g., Dess et 
al., 1997; Govindarajan, 1988; Wiklund and Shepherd, 2005), such as decisions on how 
managers are to be rewarded. This holistic configuration of organizational features can be 
modeled as an “ideal type” construct, which captures the presence of complex interrelated 
organizational processes (Burger, 1987; Weber, 1904). Ideal type constructs do not only 
allow the empirical investigation of the simultaneous interplay among multiple 
organizational variables (Stinchcombe, 1968), they also provide a useful platform for 
theory testing (De Clercq et al., 2010; Doty and Glick, 1994). In particular, a systems 
approach to the study of organizational contingencies postulates that the more an 
organization deviates from the ideal configuration, the less is its expected effectiveness 
(Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Ketchen et al., 1997).  
We have argued that specific features of the organizational context—as captured 
in high levels of job rotation, decision autonomy, social interaction, and interactional 
fairness—promote knowledge flows across functional areas, which in turn is essential to 
realizing the innovation-promotion effect of interdependent rewards. In this sense, the 
“ideal” holistic configuration pertains to the situation in which the individual contextual 
features reinforce each another in promoting knowledge sharing (Grant, 1996; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000) and, consequently, take their most beneficial forms with respect to the 
successful exploitation of reward interdependence. In contrast, to the extent that 
organizations do not reach that ideal state, their internal organizational context may limit 
how interdependent rewards can be effectively leveraged. Conceptually, the resulting 
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“friction” in knowledge exchange informs the extent to which internal organizational 
features deviate from the “ideal” holistic configuration (Doty and Glick, 1994); higher 
deviations should undermine the effective implementation of reward interdependence 
(Venkatraman, 1989). 
On the basis of these arguments, we hypothesize that the relationship between 
reward interdependence and product innovation is stronger when the organizational 
context comes closer to the “ideal” holistic configuration of job rotation, decision 
autonomy, social interaction, and interactional fairness. In particular, these four 
features—in addition to individually affecting the level of knowledge exchange—
reinforce one another in promoting knowledge flows within the organization and thus in 
turning reward interdependence into enhanced product innovation. 
H6. The proximity of the organizational context to the ideal holistic configuration 
of job rotation, decision autonomy, social interaction, and interactional fairness 
positively moderates the relationship between reward interdependence and 
product innovation such that the relationship is stronger when the proximity is 
higher. 
 
Beyond examining the collective contingency effects of the aforementioned 
organizational features is the question whether the structural and relational features are 
equally potent for turning reward interdependence into enhanced product innovation. On 
the one hand, organizations may have more direct control over structural features such as 
job rotation and decision autonomy (Campion et al., 1994; Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004), such that their usefulness for enhancing knowledge flows and hence for leveraging 
reward interdependence may be stronger. On the other hand, relational features, such as 
social interaction and interaction fairness, are more tightly connected to managers’ day-
to-day functioning (Payne et al., 2011; Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998), such that their beneficial 
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effects on the exploitation of reward interdependence may be more enduring. In light of 
these two opposing arguments, we do not present a formal hypothesis that compares the 
moderating effects of organizations’ proximity to their ideal structural and relational 
configurations, but instead undertake this comparison in an exploratory fashion. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample and Data Collection 
Similar to approaches in prior research (De Clercq et al., 2010; Simons and 
Peterson, 2000; Song et al., 2006), we applied a single-respondent design and obtained 
contact information about managers, active in either technology- or marketing-oriented 
functions, who worked for Canadian-based firms. Although this specification does not 
span all possible functional areas, extant research points to the critical role these 
functional areas have in shaping a firm’s innovative endeavors (e.g., Griffin and Hauser, 
1996; Li and Calantone, 1998; Song and Parry, 1993). To ensure that the contacted 
managers were knowledgeable about their firms’ innovative postures and overall internal 
functioning, we included only managers who held either a vice-president or 
director/department head title as possible participants. 
We sent survey instruments to these managers using a random selection of 1,500 
firms from a database maintained by a private organization and applied Dillman’s (1978) 
total design method. First, we sent a mailing packet that included a cover letter addressed 
personally to the managers, a questionnaire, and a pre-paid return envelope. Second, 
follow-up calls were conducted two weeks after the initial mailing to those who had not 
responded. Third, four weeks after the initial mailing, we sent replacement questionnaires 
to the non-respondents. Because some of the initially selected firms were not active any 
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more, had moved and their new address could not be identified, or no longer employed 
the selected respondents, the number of potential respondents equaled 950. We received 
232 completed surveys, which represented a response rate of 24%. We found no 
substantial differences between respondents and nonrespondents, or early and late 
respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977). 
A follow-up survey, conducted six months after the initial one, used a shortened 
format and was sent to the original respondents. Specifically, for each construct, we 
chose one proxy item, different from the specific items in the original survey, that best 
captured the general content domain of the construct (De Clercq and Sapienza, 2006; Yli-
Renko et al., 2001). This approach reduces recall and consistency bias and enhances 
confidence that positive and significant correlations between original and follow-up 
survey items can be interpreted as evidence of the absence of common method bias (Yli-
Renko et al., 2001). We received 78 responses; all validation items correlated positively 
with the original measures, as we report subsequently. Further, we did not find significant 
differences between firms that responded to the follow-up survey and those that did not 
for the dependent, independent, or control variables captured in the original survey; thus, 
attrition bias between the first and second surveys should not be a concern. 
Measurement 
The scales used to measure the constructs came from extant literature. All items 
were measured on five-point Likert scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). We summarize the study’s key measures along with their psychometric 
properties in Table 1, and we include the correlations and descriptive statistics of these 
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key measures in Table 2. In light of our research focus, we worded the items to capture 
phenomena that take place at the firm level rather than the functional manager level.2  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Product innovation. Drawing from previous research (Jansen et al., 2006), we 
measured product innovation with items that captured the extent to which the firm 
develops new products and services, such as whether the firm accepts demands outside its 
existing products or commercializes products that are completely new to it.3 This measure 
(alpha = .80) correlated positively with its single-item counterpart from the follow-up 
survey (r = .44, p < .001). Unlike “objective” proxies (such as R&D intensity relative to 
total assets) which tend to capture a specific innovation outcome, our measure includes a 
comprehensive set of items that reflect the extent to which the introduction of new 
products is common practice within the firm. Nonetheless, to assess our measure’s 
predictive validity, we used Hoovers Online Prospector Database to collect data on 
“income growth over the past year” for a subset of the sampled firms (n =70). We found a 
positive correlation (r = .26, p < .05) between our measure and income growth. 
Reward interdependence. We measured the level of reward interdependence with 
three items that assessed the interdependence of functional units’ rewards (Xie et al., 
2003). For example, respondents indicated the extent to which the functional units in their 
                                                 
2 The social interaction and interactional fairness items assessed relationships between people in 
technology- and marketing-oriented functions. Yet to ensure that the responses would cover organization-
wide phenomena rather than idiosyncratic issues that have to do with specific departments, in the survey 
instrument we defined these “function” types in a broad sense. Particularly, we clarified that we were not 
interested in interactions or relationships between specific departments but rather between “the managers 
who typically are most preoccupied with technological (or technical) issues such as operations, 
engineering, or research and development on the one hand, and those who are typically most preoccupied 
with commercial activities such as marketing or sales on the other.” 
3 In essence, our measure captures firms’ “exploratory” product innovation, which emphasizes the novelty 
of the firm’s product offerings, instead of incremental changes to existing products (Jansen et al., 2006). 
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company were evaluated on their joint performance instead of separate departmental 
performance and whether they shared the rewards of successfully commercialized new 
products. The measure (alpha = .78) correlated positively with its single-item counterpart 
from the follow-up survey (r = .46, p < .001). 
Job rotation. The job rotation measure was based on three items adapted from Xie 
et al. (2003); respondents thus indicated the extent to which employees rotated across 
functional areas or whether people in a given functional unit sometimes took on roles in 
another functional unit. The measure (alpha = .80) also correlated positively with its 
single-item counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .33, p < .01). 
Decision autonomy. Following Dyer and Song (1998), we measured the level of 
decision autonomy with four items reflecting the extent to which decision making was 
decentralized in the organization. These questions were reverse coded. For example, 
respondents indicated to what extent individual units needed to get permission from top 
management when they wanted to make a decision. The measure (alpha = .90) correlated 
positively with its counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .49, p < .001). 
Social interaction. Following prior studies (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Yli-Renko et 
al., 2001), we measured social interaction with four items that reflected the strength of 
social relationships among managers in different functional units. For example, we asked 
the respondents to rate the extent to which managers knew one another on a personal 
level or maintained close social relationships. The measure (alpha = .81) correlated 
positively with its single-item counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .42, p < .001). 
Interactional fairness. The four-item measure of interactional fairness was 
adapted from prior research on organizational justice (Colquitt, 2001; Masterson, 2001), 
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and assessed, for example, whether people were treated with kindness and consideration 
by colleagues in other functions and whether their rights as working partners were 
respected by others. The measure (alpha = .87) correlated positively with its single-item 
counterpart from the follow-up survey (r = .38, p < .001). 
Proximity to the ideal holistic configuration. Ideal type patterns among variables 
can be generated either empirically or theoretically (Doty and Glick, 1994; Drazin and 
Van de Ven, 1985). While empirical approaches involve arbitrary decisions about what 
constitutes the optimal profile and reduce the statistical power for testing hypotheses 
(Govindarajan, 1988), the theoretical approach, which is informed by conceptual 
judgments about the ideal values of each underlying construct, aligns best with the logical 
structure of typology theories (De Clercq et al., 2010; Doty and Glick, 1994). Hence, we 
adopted the latter approach to specify the ideal holistic configuration of job rotation, 
decision autonomy, social interaction, and interactional fairness. Since the four constructs 
were measured on 1-to-5 scales, we assessed their highest value (5) as representing the 
most beneficial representation of each construct. The ideal configuration thus constitutes 
the situation in which these four constitutive constructs reach their highest values.4 
Consistent with previous research (e.g., De Clercq et al., 2010; Vorhies and Morgan, 
2003), we calculated the Euclidean distance of each firm from this ideal configuration. 
We then transformed this distance into its opposite, negative value to represent it as the 
proximity to the ideal configuration (i.e., higher values capture higher proximity). Thus, 
                                                 
4 The assumption that the maximum value represents the ideal value (i.e., the higher the firm scores on the 
four features, the “better”) aligns with the fact that the survey questions capturing the four features assessed 
respondents’ extent of agreement with whether what are conceived of as optimal manifestations of the 
features exist in their organizations. In addition, this assumption is based on the notion that firms typically 
perform below their “global performance frontier” (Swink et al., 2006). In particular, to the extent that 
firms can make significant improvements in how the four features are implemented at a given time, they 
can increase their levels simultaneously without facing significant trade-offs between them (De Clercq et 
al., 2010).  
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the measure of proximity to the ideal configuration is presented by Prox(i) = -√∑(Xij - 
Xmj)
2, where Xij represents the value of the individual feature j (job rotation, decision 
autonomy, social interaction, and interactional fairness) for firm i, and Xmj represents the 
maximum (i.e., ideal) value for that feature. 
Control variables. We controlled for firm size using a log transformation of the 
number of full-time employees. Because different industries vary in their propensity to 
engage in product innovation, we controlled for industry sector too, including 
manufacturing (standard industrial classification [SIC] 20–39), nonfinancial services (SIC 
70–89), mining (SIC 10–14), construction (SIC 15–17), transportation (SIC 40–49), 
wholesale (SIC 50–51), retail (SIC 52–59), and finance (SIC 60–67). We also measured 
whether the respondent represented a technology- or marketing-oriented function.  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Measurement Estimation 
We undertook confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of a six-factor measurement 
model. The model’s factor loadings were greater than .40, normalized residuals less than 
2.58, and modification indices less than 3.84 (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). This 
measurement model also fit the data well: χ2(190) = 259.10, goodness-of-fit index (GFI) = 
.91, Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) = .97, confirmatory fit index (CFI) = .97, and root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .04. The significant factor loadings (t > 2.0; 
Gerbing and Anderson, 1988) and magnitude of the average variance extracted (AVE > 
.50; Bagozzi and Yi, 1988) provided evidence of the convergent validity of the scales. 
Further, we found strong evidence of discriminant validity in the significant differences 
between the unconstrained model and constrained model (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988) 
for all 15 pairs of constructs, as well as in the lack of confidence intervals that included 
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1.0 for the correlations between construct pairs (p < .05) (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). 
Finally, the AVE estimates of the constructs were greater than the squared correlations 
between corresponding pairs of constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
We conducted several diagnostic analyses to rule out common method bias. First, 
a CFA for a single-factor model revealed poorer fit with the data (2(205) = 1,623.99, GFI 
= .58, TLI = .37, CFI = .44, RMSEA = .17)—significantly worse (Δ2(15) = 1,364.89, p < 
.001) than the fit of the aforementioned six-factor model—so common method bias did 
not appear to be a serious concern. Second, similar to previous studies that relied on 
individual common source data to investigate organization-level innovation or 
entrepreneurship (e.g., Camarero and Garrido, 2012; De Clercq et al., 2010; Song et al., 
2006) and following Podsakoff et al.’s (2003) recommended approach to test for common 
method bias, we ran several pairs of structural equation models (SEM) that enabled a 
comparison between a model that included an interaction term and another model with an 
added common method factor. For example, for the reward interdependence × job 
rotation interaction models (i.e., the equivalent of regression Model 4 in Table 3), the chi-
square difference between the two models was not significant (Δ2(1) = .572; ns), and 
only small changes in the size and significance of the paths across the two models 
emerged. The same pattern of results emerged for the SEM equivalents of the three 
models that included the other two-way interactions. Third, we applied the CFA marker 
technique (Williams et al., 2010), which requires the estimation and comparison of a 
baseline model with the Method-C (or non-congeneric) model and Method-U (or 
congeneric) model as a means to test for the presence of common method variance (for a 
detailed explanation, see Williams et al. 2010, p. 494). Using a two-item measure of 
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respondents’ organizational experience (which captured their organizational tenure and 
job tenure) as the theoretically unrelated marker variable, we found that the fit statistics 
for the two method models were not statistically better than those for the baseline model. 
Rather, there were no significant differences in fit between the baseline model (χ2(234) = 
319.76) and either the Method-C model (χ2(233) = 318.47; Δχ2 = 1.29, Δdf = 1, ns) or the 
Method-U model (χ2(212) = 284.78; Δχ2 = 34.98, Δdf = 22, ns) when we tested for the 
presence of equal or unequal method effects, respectively. Therefore, the CFA marker 
analysis offered no evidence of an influence of common method variance on the 
relationships among the six focal constructs in the theoretical model. Fourth, common 
method bias is less salient in studies that include highly educated respondents and multi-
item scales (Bergkvist and Rossiter, 2007). In all, these considerations alleviate concerns 
related to the use of single respondents. 
Hypotheses Testing 
We used regression analysis to test the hypotheses (Table 3). After mean-
centering the interacting variables, the variance inflation factor values were far below the 
threshold of 10, so multicollinearity was not a concern in our analyses (Aiken and West, 
1991). Model 1 contained only the control variables, Model 2 added the effect of reward 
interdependence, and Model 3 included the direct effects of job rotation, decision 
autonomy, social interaction, and interactional fairness. Model 2 revealed a positive 
relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation (β = .235, p < .001), 
in support of the baseline H1. Of the four contextual variables, only decision autonomy 
and social interaction had significant (positive) effects on product innovation (p < .01). 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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---------------------------------------- 
In H2–H5 we predicted moderating effects of the two structural (job rotation and 
decision autonomy) and two relational (social interaction and interactional fairness) 
features on the relationship between reward interdependence and product innovation. To 
this end, in Models 4–7 we added the four corresponding interaction terms, one at a time, 
to avoid multicollinearity problems or masking true interaction effects (Aiken and West, 
1991) as recommended in prior studies that test multiple interactions (e.g., De Clercq et 
al., 2010; Zahra and Hayton, 2008). Model 4 revealed a positive and significant 
interaction effect between reward interdependence and job rotation on product innovation 
(β = .164, p < .01). To clarify the nature of the interaction, in Figure 2 (Panel A) we 
plotted the corresponding effects (Cohen et al., 2003): The reward interdependence–
product innovation relationship was strongly positive at high levels of job rotation but 
neutral at low levels, in support of H2. In Model 5, the interaction effect between reward 
interdependence and decision autonomy was not significant, so we cannot confirm H3. 
Model 6 supported H4: the interaction effect between reward interdependence and 
social interaction on product innovation was positive and significant (β = .235, p < .001). 
Its plot in Figure 2, Panel B, indicates that the reward interdependence–product 
innovation relationship was positive at high levels of social interaction and neutral at low 
levels. Finally, we found support for H5 in the positive interaction between reward 
interdependence and interactional fairness in Model 7 (β = .235, p < .001). The plot in 
Figure 2, Panel C, shows that the reward interdependence–product innovation 
relationship was attenuated at low levels of interactional fairness.5 
                                                 
5 In order to account for possible direct interrelationships among the four moderators, as well as between 
reward interdependence and the moderators, we undertook a robustness check, using structural equation 
modeling, whereby we included all possible covariances among the independent and moderating variables 
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When we included all four interaction terms simultaneously in Model 8, the 
interaction effects, though consistent in their positive signs, become subdued and even 
insignificant in the case of job rotation and decision autonomy. This result can be 
attributed to the specific interpretations of each of the individual interaction terms in the 
presence of the three other interaction terms. In particular, each of the interaction terms in 
Model 8 represents the differential effect of reward interdependence on product 
innovation for (a) the non-average values of the specific moderator (job rotation, decision 
autonomy, social interaction, or interactional justice, respectively) and (b) the average 
values of the other three moderators Thus, their simultaneous inclusion implies that each 
moderator operates in a space that only contains the average values of the other 
moderators (Aiken and West, 1991). For example, while the moderating effect of job 
rotation in Model 8 reflects the situation in which the values of the other three moderators 
are average, in Model 4 this moderating effect covers the entire range of values for the 
other three moderators. The diminished or absent significance levels in Model 8 thus 
suggest that each of the moderating effects is sensitive to the other moderators, which is 
in line with the configurational hypothesis tested next (De Clercq et al., 2010).6  
Hypothesis 6 argues that when the organizational context is more proximate to the 
ideal holistic configuration of job rotation, decision autonomy, social interaction, and 
interactional justice, the relationship between reward interdependence and product 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Lattin et al., 2003). We find that the signs and significance levels of the hypothesized moderating effects in 
these models are consistent with those of the focal analysis reported in Table 2. Thus we find support for 
the theorized moderating effects on the reward interdependence–product innovation relationship, beyond 
the presence of possible interdependencies among the variables. 
6 Furthermore, while the simultaneous inclusion of multiple interaction terms may obscure the detection of 
true moderating effects due the complex constellation of multiple factors (Aiken and West, 1991; Neter et 
al., 1985), a model that includes all interaction terms together indicates the robustness of the results to the 
extent that the signs of the interactions are consistent with those found in the models in which the 
interaction terms are included separately (Arnold, 1982; Covin et al., 2006), which is the case here. 
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innovation will be stronger. In Model 9, we included the main effect of the proximity 
variable to the model that included the control variables and the main effect of reward 
interdependence.7 The effect of the proximity variable was positive and significant (β = 
.161, p < .01), explaining significant additional variance (∆R2 = .026, p < .01), relative to 
Model 2. In Model 10, we added the interaction term between reward interdependence 
and proximity, and found that its effect is positive and significant (β = .172, p < .001). 
Figure 2 (Panel D) visualizes this effect, showing the relationship between reward 
interdependence and product innovation for high and low values of the proximity to ideal 
holistic configuration. When proximity is high, the relationship between reward 
interdependence and product innovation is positive; when proximity is low, reward 
interdependence has virtually no relationship to product innovation. These results provide 
support for Hypothesis 6.   
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2A-D about here 
---------------------------------------- 
In a post-hoc analysis, reported in Table 4, we compared the relative potency of 
firms’ proximity to the ideal structural and relational configurations in converting reward 
interdependence into enhanced product innovation.8 The interaction effects of reward 
interdependence with both the ideal structural (Model 11) and relational (Model 12) 
configurations are positive and significant (β = .138, p < .05 and β = .245, p < .001, 
respectively). Therefore, consistent with the main results in Table 2, organizations with 
greater proximities to the ideal structural and relational configurations exhibit stronger 
                                                 
7 We do not include the individual direct effects of the four organizational features in this model because of 
their strong overlap with the proximity variable (De Clercq et al., 2010).  
8 These two proximity variables were calculated in a fashion similar to the “holistic” proximity variable 
used in the main analyses. In particular, we calculated the opposite values of the Euclidean distances from 
the ideal values (5) of job rotation and decision autonomy for the structural configuration, and from the 
ideal values (5) of social interaction and interactional fairness for the relational configuration.  
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relationships between reward interdependence and product innovation. To make a direct 
comparison of the two configurational effects, we also entered them simultaneously in 
Model 13. We found that the interaction of reward interdependence with the proximity to 
ideal relational configuration remains significant (β = .219, p < .001), but the significance 
of its interaction with the proximity to the ideal structural configuration disappeared. 
Thus, the results indicate that because the less tangible, relational features may be more 
deeply anchored in managers’ day-to-day functioning, they are more powerful for 
converting interdependent rewards into production innovation compared to the structural 
features which perhaps are perceived as being imposed or enforced by top management 
and hence are less potent in leveraging reward interdependence. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION 
For organizations to develop new products, their functional units must coordinate 
their efforts (Sherman et al., 2005; Townsend et al., 2010). One way to do so is to make 
managers’ rewards dependent on the performance of colleagues across the organization 
(Barnes et al., 2011; Chen and Tjosvold, 2012; Xie et al., 2003). When the performance 
of colleagues in other units has ramifications for returns on their own efforts, managers 
feel shared ownership of new creative ideas (McDonough, 2000), which stimulates their 
collective motivation to bring such ideas to a successful end (O’Reilly and Tushman, 
2004). High reward interdependence thus can stimulate the synchronization and 
coordination of efforts across functional borders, which enhances the firm’s ability to 
develop new products (Bharadwaj and Menon, 2000). Our study finds empirical support 
 29 
for this thesis in the positive relationship between reward interdependence and product 
innovation. 
Yet even if reward interdependence enhances product innovation, its effectiveness 
does not materialize automatically because managers in higher-performing functional 
units may exhibit less motivation (Lee and Ahn, 2007), whereas lower-performing 
counterparts suffer increased anxiety (Ames, 1981; Drabman et al., 1974). For example, 
weaker managers may “counter-react” to reward interdependence and become less 
forthcoming with their important function-specific knowledge, even if it is needed to 
support the firm’s product innovation pursuits, because they hope to conceal their poor 
performance (Wageman and Baker, 1997). High levels of reward interdependence also 
can lead to “free riding,” whereby managers count on the efforts and actions of others, 
rather than their own, to contribute to collective performance in product innovation 
projects (Albanese and Van Fleet, 1985; Lee and Ahn, 2007). In response, we have 
investigated how several features of organizational context might help overcome these 
challenges and increase the instrumentality of reward interdependence for product 
innovation pursuits through their promotion of intra-firm knowledge sharing. 
First, we find that the contribution of reward interdependence to product 
innovation increases to the extent that managers rotate across functional units or take on 
specific roles in units other than their own (Campion et al., 1994). When functional 
managers shift across departments, they gain greater exposure to new experiences and 
complementary skills, which can offer them insights into how to leverage function-
specific knowledge to attain higher collective performance, thus enhancing the 
effectiveness of reward interdependence (Xie et al., 2003). By trying on different 
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“organizational hats,” managers experience firsthand how the contributions of each unit 
might enhance collective performance, which will increase their own rewards under a 
reward interdependence system. In contrast, when job rotation is minimal, managers have 
less understanding of or confidence about how the expertise of colleagues in other 
functional units might contribute to collective performance in product innovation, which 
increases the likelihood that they keep function-specific knowledge for themselves, even 
if it would be useful for the firm’s product innovation pursuits, thereby diminishing the 
effectiveness of reward interdependence.  
Second, and contrary to what we anticipated, granting decision autonomy to 
functional units does not increase the translation of reward interdependence into product 
innovation. We had hypothesized that the freedom associated with enhanced levels of 
decision autonomy would encourage cross-functional exchanges and thus understanding 
of how the combination of function-specific knowledge might enhance collective 
performance. Nevertheless, other mechanisms may counter these effects. For example, 
the freedom afforded to managers in conditions of high decision autonomy might 
exacerbate their perceptions or fears of relinquished decision power if they were to share 
sensitive information with peers who are granted the same decision autonomy by top 
management. In this scenario, managers might consider their own unit to be “personal 
turf” that needs protection (Luo et al., 2006). Further, when functional units enjoy high 
levels of autonomy in their decision making, top management may lose its ability to 
“synchronize” or match the efforts of individual managers to attain enhanced levels of 
organization-wide product innovation (Hill et al., 1992), such that the potential inherent 
in reward interdependence never gets fully realized. We acknowledge that these 
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explanations are somewhat speculative; a more detailed and perhaps qualitative 
investigation of the interplay between decision autonomy and reward interdependence is 
warranted. 
With respect to the relational context, we find support for a positive interaction 
between reward interdependence and social interaction, such that the effect of reward 
interdependence on product innovation is stronger at higher levels of social interaction. 
Social capital literature suggests that embedded relationships motivate exchange partners 
to work harder to attain collective goals, which enables them to work more effectively 
together to overcome problems, obtain direct feedback during the process, and ultimately 
reach superior innovative solutions (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Uzzi, 1997). Similarly, 
strong relationships induce greater motivation to coordinate efforts with exchange 
partners because of the satisfaction that coordination infuses into socially connected 
actors (Granovetter, 1985). Strong social ties may also create a common identity among 
managers (Leana and van Buren, 1999), such that the goal of achieving greater collective 
performance in product innovation projects is easier to obtain. 
We find a similar positive role for interactional fairness. When managers treat one 
another fairly and show respect for others’ opinions, their perception that reward 
interdependence can make them vulnerable to the whims of poorly performing colleagues 
will be mitigated (Qiu et al., 2009; Rupp and Cropanzano, 2002). Their motivation to 
work hard to attain a common goal, such as pursuing organization-wide product 
innovation, thus increases. If interactions appear fair, managers may work more 
intensively toward the integration of disparate pieces of function-specific knowledge that 
can enhance collective performance, and the implementation of reward interdependence 
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then should be more effective. In contrast, when perceptions of interactional fairness are 
low, managers may be less forthcoming about sharing their expertise, even if that attitude 
hampers collective performance, because they feel that their opinions will be unfairly 
criticized (Bies and Moag, 1986).  
We also find a strong holistic configurational effect of the four organizational 
features. Consistent with the systems approach to the study of organizational 
contingencies (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Ketchen et al., 1993, 1997), we show that 
deviations from the ideal holistic configuration of the four features can undermine the 
effective implementation of interdependent rewards. In particular, the relationship 
between reward interdependence and product innovation is stronger when the 
organizational context exhibits higher proximity to an ideal configuration that promotes 
knowledge flows. We attribute this effect to the notion that these organizational features 
reinforce one another in enhancing knowledge flows within the organization (De Clercq 
et al., 2010; Floyd and Lane, 2000), and thus collectively they are particularly 
instrumental for channeling reward interdependence into higher product innovation. 
Although organizational features individually encourage managers to exchange 
knowledge with one another, their simultaneous presence can make the exchange deeper 
and more sustainable (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; De Clercq et al., 2010; Grant, 1996). 
In other words, if none of these features is deficient, the quality of the knowledge flows 
may be amplified, such that the effective implementation of interdependent rewards 
becomes more salient. Furthermore, the post-hoc analysis indicates that the relational 
context is particularly potent, more so than the structural context, in terms of converting 
reward interdependence into enhanced product innovativeness. This finding may be 
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attributed to the aforementioned challenges of political battles (Luo et al., 2006) and 
limited synchronization (Hill et al., 1992) when decision autonomy is high, as well as to 
managers’ beliefs that structural measures (whether they pertain to job rotation or 
decision autonomy) are forced upon them. 
Limitations and Future Research 
This study contains some limitations that offer opportunities for further research. 
For example, it could be useful to consider the role of more complex reward structures—
such as the ratio of independent and interdependent rewards—in shaping product 
innovation, and the enabling roles of different organizational features for effectively 
implementing these reward structures (Barnes et al., 2011). Additional research could 
also adopt longitudinal designs to investigate the causal processes that link reward 
interdependence and product innovation, as well as to consider possible 
interdependencies among the organizational features included in this study. Further, by 
focusing on four specific features of organizational context, we may have ignored other 
factors relevant to the successful conversion of reward interdependence into product 
innovation, such as the formality of the firm’s decision-making process (Auh and 
Menguc, 2007) or different forms of organizational justice, such as distributive or 
procedural justice (Colquitt, 2001). Future research could also undertake industry 
comparisons, for example, in terms of how external competitive pressures may make 
employees more willing to accept that their rewards depend on the performance of 
organizational peers (Lahiri et al., 2008). 
Another avenue for research would be to determine whether the potency of the 
interaction effects we examined is different for cross-functional teams that are formally 
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assigned or self-selected (Feng et al., 2010; Rulke, 1996), or for exploratory (radical) 
versus exploitative (incremental) innovations (Jansen et al., 2006; Garcia and Calantone, 
2002). For example, it could be that the uncertainty associated with radical changes to the 
firm’s current product offerings makes the role of interdependent rewards particularly 
prominent, as well as invigorates the enabling roles of the studied contextual features in 
converting these rewards into higher innovative outcomes. Moreover, given the different 
tradeoffs between incremental and radical innovations in terms of innovation speed, 
product quality, and development cost, future research could build on Barnes et al. (2011) 
to examine the possibility of both beneficial and detrimental effects of independent 
rewards on the speed, quality, and cost of product innovation.   
Moreover, this study focused on an important driver of firms’ product innovation 
pursuits rather than the consequences of these pursuits. Extant research indicates a 
beneficial impact of firms’ product innovation levels on their performance (e.g., Li and 
Atuahene-Gima, 2001), yet some researchers suggest insignificant or even negative 
relationships (e.g., Capon et al., 1990). Therefore, research could examine whether the 
contingency factors in this study influence not only the extent to which reward 
interdependence leads to product innovation but also the nature of the product 
innovation–performance relationship. 
Practical Implications 
This study also offers important implications for the management of product 
innovation. It suggests that in the pursuit of product innovation, top management must 
consider linking individual rewards to collective performance, and then enhance the 
innovation potential that reward interdependence generates by creating organizational 
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conditions that lend themselves to the open sharing of function-specific knowledge. 
These conditions can diminish feelings of constraint and suspicions that managers will 
misuse or free-ride on others’ efforts. That is, the organizational context in which 
functional managers operate is critical, particularly with regard to structural and relational 
boundaries. 
Thus, the intra-organizational boundary conditions we study reveal how firms that 
aim to develop new products can benefit the most from implementing reward 
interdependence: They should be prepared to rotate key personnel across different 
functions, stimulate informal encounters that go beyond formal working routines, and 
ensure that managers are treated with respect and goodwill. For recruitment purposes 
then, the effective implementation of reward interdependence to enhance product 
innovation requires managers who are versatile enough to rotate throughout different 
parts of the organization, are willing to go out of their way to interact with colleagues in 
social settings, and have respect for the opinions of others, even if they differ from their 
own ideas. 
The study may also have importance for multinational corporations with 
subsidiaries in different countries. Because perceptions about the effectiveness of 
structural and relational arrangements are in part culturally driven (Hofstede, 1991), the 
potency of these arrangements to convert reward interdependence into enhanced product 
innovation may vary across countries. For instance, job rotation may be a more potent 
instrument for channeling reward interdependence toward product innovation in 
individualistic countries (e.g., United States, Great Britain, Canada) than in their 
collectivistic counterparts (e.g., Japan, Korea, China), even if the practice is more 
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common in countries of the latter group such as Japan (Dedoussis, 1995). In 
individualistic countries, achieving success through personal means is regarded more 
highly than success derived through collective efforts, so managerial practices in these 
countries tend to emphasize functional specialization over the development of generalist 
skills (Song et al., 2010), despite the benefits of those skills for product innovation. 
Therefore, compared with collectivistic countries that value and encourage interactions 
with peers throughout the organization (Dien, 1999), individualistic societies may gain 
the most incremental value from the introduction of job rotation as a mechanism to 
increase the effectiveness of interdependent rewards for enhanced product innovation. 
Furthermore, internal resistance to reward interdependence itself might be greater in 
individualistic countries (Hofstede, 1991), such that the structural and relational 
contingencies studied herein may be most valuable for spurring product innovation in 
these countries. 
Conclusion 
To conclude, by considering various structural and relational contextual factors, 
this study has directed greater attention to the internal boundary conditions that determine 
the effectiveness of reward interdependence across functional units in terms of firms’ 
ability to enhance product innovation. We hope this work is a catalyst for efforts to 
pursue a greater understanding of how firms with strong innovative aspirations can 
translate various cross-functional arrangements and processes into stronger competitive 
positions in the global marketplace. 
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Table 1: Constructs and Measurement Items 
 
 Factor 
Loading 
t-Value 
Product innovation (α = .80; CR = .80; AVE = .51)    
Our company accepts demands that go beyond existing products and 
services. 
0.590 7.054 
We focus on inventing new products and services. 0.760 9.267 
We experiment with new products and services in our local market. 0.744a  
We commercialize products and services that are completely new to our 
company. 
0.743 7.911 
Reward interdependence (α = .78; CR = .78; AVE = .54)   
Different departments share the rewards of a successfully commercialized 
new product. 
0.762 9.754 
Individual departments are evaluated on their joint performance instead of 
separate departmental performance. 
0.666 9.131 
Our senior management promotes cross-departmental team cohesion over 
separate departmental loyalty. 
0.773a  
Job rotation (α = .80; CR = .84; AVE = .64)   
Planned job rotation of employees is emphasized as a device for 
developing employees’ capabilities. 
0.832a  
Employees are rotated across functional areas. 0.950 13.773 
People in a given functional department (e.g., R&D, marketing) sometimes 
take on roles in another functional department. 
0.565 8.920 
Decision autonomy (α = .90; CR = .88; AVE = .71) (reverse coded)     
Any decision that is made needs to be approved by top management. 0.697 12.675 
Even small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a final 
answer. 
0.886 19.653 
Individual departments need to get permission from top management 
almost every time they want to do anything. 
0.918a  
Individual units are strongly discouraged from making their own decisions. 0.809 16.596 
Social interaction (α = .81; CR = .83; AVE = .57)   
People in technology- and marketing-related functions spend significant 
time together in social situations. 
0.830a  
People in the two functions maintain close social relationships with one 
another. 
0.959 15.694 
People in the two functions know members of the other function on a 
personal level. 
0.691 11.687 
The relationship between people in the two functions is very informal. 0.423 5.390 
Interactional fairness (α = .87; CR = .87; AVE = .64)   
Generally speaking, in the working relationship between technology- and 
marketing-related functions… 
  
People are treated in a polite manner by the other function. 0.878 17.602 
People are treated with kindness and consideration by the other function. 0.883a  
People’s personal biases are suppressed and properly managed by the other 
function. 
0.582 9.511 
People’s rights as working partners are respected by the other function. 0.806 14.832 
Notes: CR = construct reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
a Initial loading was fixed to 1 to set the scale of the construct. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 232) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Product innovation                 
2. Reward interdependence .274                
3. Job rotation .155 .430               
4. Decision autonomy .228 .321 .133              
5. Social interaction .263 .328 .334 .087             
6. Interactional fairness .205 .506 .187 .382 .331            
7. Prox. to ideal hol. config. .287 .574 .761 .499 .691 .578           
8. Company size (log) -.039 -.042 .048 .117 -.160 .041 .001          
9. Industry: manufacturing .048 -.049 -.019 -.098 -.041 .127 -.030 .108         
10. Industry: services .022 -.003 -.069 .090 .004 -.061 -.027 -.155 -.580        
11. Industry: mining -.082 .012 .040 .094 .053 -.108 .051 -.064 -.307 -.198       
12. Industry: construction .117 .154 .062 .031 .033 .070 .080 .037 -.126 -.081 -.043      
13. Industry: transportation -.114 -.017 .046 -.023 -.023 -.016 .006 .097 -.231 -.149 -.079 -.032     
14. Industry: wholesale .057 .095 .120 .043 .079 .034 .116 -.069 -.191 -.123 -.065 -.027 -.049    
15. Industry: retail .033 .002 -.039 -.069 -.046 -.070 -.077 .084 -.155 -.099 -.053 -.022 -.040 -.033   
16. Marketing-related funct. -.064 -.040 -.136 -.059 -.032 .001 -.086 .167 .034 -.038 -.083 .069 -.015 .026 .003  
Mean 3.615 3.269 2.494 3.722 2.804 3.683 -4.01 0.000 0.474 0.272 0.095 0.017 0.056 0.039 0.026 0.491 
Standard deviation 0.865 0.919 0.910 0.920 0.782 0.720 1.082 1.991 0.500 0.446 0.294 0.130 0.230 0.194 0.159 0.501 
Note: Correlations greater than |.13| are significant at p < .05
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Table 3: Regression Results (Dependent Variable: Product Innovation) (N = 232) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Company size (log employed) -.010 -.007 -.008 -.005 -.009 .006 .002 .010 -.011 .003 
Industry: manufacturinga .621 .512 .458 .410 .461 .493 .348 .361 .495 .456 
Industry: services .595 .479 .377 .363 .406 .428 .322 .332 .467 .491 
Industry: mining .335 .212 .059 .045 .084 .097 -.004 .003 .172 .161 
Industry: construction 1.369* .994+ .955+ .838 .949+ .961+ .780 .762 .981+ .835 
Industry: transportation .173 .067 .016 -.041 .022 -.031 -.094 -.133 .042 -.032 
Industry: wholesale .819+ .599 .466 .407 .479 .383 .331 .270 .523 .415 
Industry: retail .760 .636 .669 .632 .670 .542 .360 .323 .705 .533 
Marketing-oriented functionb -.120 -.103 -.087 -.096 -.075 -.059 -.090 -.087 -.079 -.064 
H1: Reward interdependence  .235*** .131+ .174* .128+ .168* .145* .186* .127+ .192** 
Job rotation   .002 -.016 .003 -.006 .005 -.009   
Decision autonomy   .170** .157* .180** .161** .178** .158*   
Social interaction   .229** .209** .223** .179** .206** .177*   
Interactional fairness   -.033 -.025 -.014 -.032 .034 .013   
H2: Reward interdependence × Job 
rotation 
   
.164**    .080   
H3: Reward interdependence × 
Decision autonomy 
    .070   
-.053   
H4: Reward interdependence × 
Social interaction 
     
.235*** 
  
.132+   
H5: Reward interdependence × 
Interactional fairness 
      
.235*** 
 
.194*   
Proximity to ideal holistic 
configuration 
        .161** .136* 
H6: Reward interdependence × 
Proximity to ideal holistic 
configuration 
         .172*** 
F-value 
R2 
∆R2,c 
1.412 
.054 
 
2.837** 
.114 
.060*** 
3.272*** 
.174 
.060** 
3.564*** 
.198 
.024** 
3.161*** 
.180 
.006 
3.993*** 
.217 
.043*** 
3.998*** 
.217 
.043*** 
3.761*** 
.241 
.067*** 
3.265*** 
.140 
.026** 
4.338*** 
.192 
.052*** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (two-tailed p-values). ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; + p < .10. 
a Base case = Finance industry. b Base case = technology-oriented function. 
c The ∆R2 value for Model 2 reflects the change relative to Model 1; the ∆R2 value for Model 3 reflects the change relative to Model 2; the ∆R2 values for Models 
4 to 8 reflect the changes relative to Model 3; the ∆R2 value for Model 9 reflects the change relative to Model 2; the ∆R2 value for Model 10 reflects the change 
relative to Model 9.
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Table 4: Post-hoc Analysis (Dependent Variable: Product Innovation) (N = 232) 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 
Company size (log employed) .001 .006 .013 
Industry: manufacturinga .471 .418 .464 
Industry: services .497 .392 .484 
Industry: mining .183 .079 .172 
Industry: construction .894+ .845 .871 
Industry: transportation .024 -.076 -.037 
Industry: wholesale .498 .326 .388 
Industry: retail .681 .389 .434 
Marketing-oriented functionb -.083 -.068 -.071 
Reward interdependence .160* .165* .181* 
Job rotation  .006  
Decision autonomy  .155**  
Social interaction .176*   
Interactional fairness .057   
Similarity to ideal structural 
configuration 
.064 
 
 .068 
Similarity to ideal relational 
configuration 
 .136* .142* 
Reward interdependence × Similarity to 
ideal structural configuration 
.138*  .032 
Reward interdependence × Similarity to 
ideal relational configuration 
 .245*** .219*** 
F-value 
R2 
∆R2,c 
3.336*** 
.177 
.063*** 
4.530*** 
.226 
.112*** 
4.092*** 
.209 
.095*** 
Notes: Unstandardized coefficients (two-tailed p-values). ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; + p < .10. 
a Base case = Finance industry. b Base case = technology-oriented function. 
c The ∆R2 values for Models 11 to 13 reflect the changes relative to Model 2. 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Model 
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Figure 2: Moderating Effects on the Reward Interdependence–Product Innovation 
Relationship 
 (A) Job Rotation 
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(B) Social Interaction  
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(C) Interactional Fairness  
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(D) Proximity to the Ideal Holistic Configuration 
 
 
 
